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THE "DIRTY LITTLE SECRET"- WHY CLASS ACTIONS
HAVE EMERGED AS THE ONLY VIABLE OPTION FOR
WOMEN INMATES ATTEMPTING TO SATISFY THE
SUBJECTIVE PRONG OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
IN SUITS FOR CUSTODIAL SEXUAL ABUSE
Women [prisoners] complain of male corrections officers re-
fusing to leave their cells so they can dress, caressing their
breasts and other parts of their bodies, pulling down their
pants in front of them, touching themselves, making lewd
and offensive comments, following them around the facility,
assigning them to their offices as clerks, watching them use
the bathroom and shower, coming on to the unit without
warning of their presence, and frequently promising them
favors and presents for sexual activity'
Despite a growing concern for the vast number of frivolous
claims filed on behalf of prisoners, sexual abuse of women in-
mates by their male guards is a pervasive and legitimate
problem in both state and federal prisons of the United States.
The media and the legal profession have devoted increased at-
tention to sexual abuse in prisons for several reasons, including
the rapid increase in the number of incarcerated women guarded
by men,2 the umque perceptions of women inmates who often
1. HUMAi RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN's RIGHTS PROJECT, ALL TOO FAMILIAR: SEXUAL
ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS 290 (1996) [hereinafter ALL Too FAMILIAR]
(quoting testimony of Ruth Cassell before the New York Governor's Task Force on
Sexual Harassment, Sept. 24, 1992). Despite these accounts of abuse, corrections offi-
cers and members of the legal profession fear the potential repercussions of respond-
ing to an inmate's false claims. An attorney representing the former deputy warden
at the Georgia Women's Correctional Institution expressed this fear in the wake of
the events surrounding the Georgia prison sex scandal: "They've let loose a witch
hunt in the prison system. The government's looking for scapegoats, and the prison-
ers have figured out how to run the prisons by accusing everyone in authority of
sexual misconduct." Lauran Neergaard, 14 Are Indicted in Georgia Prison Sexual
Abuse Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 1992, at 3, available in 1992 WL 4201362.
2. See ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 20-22; see also Steven A. Holmes,
Rape of Women Prisoners Increasing, Groups Say They Try to Help Win Some Cases,
but Prisons Often Say Sex Was Consensual, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 19, 1997,
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have a prior history of sexual abuse,3 the disturbing lack of
prosecutions for custodial sexual misconduct, and the ultimate
failure of the lawsuits actually filed by women prisoners.4
The power dynamics inherent in the inmate/guard relation-
ship and in the nature of confinement itself contribute to the
problem of seeking a remedy for sexual abuse. "An inmate's
word alone will not suffice as grounds for disciplining a staff
member.... ." Sexually abused female inmates are often reluc-
tant to come forward to report incidents of abuse because they
fear staff reprisal, worry that others will accuse them of lying, or
want to avoid being labeled a snitch.6 As a result, "prison offi-
cials, critics and inmates conclude that more sexual misconduct
goes on than is reported."' The problems in calculating and rem-
edying the frequency of sexual abuse in prisons mirror those in
other areas of the law. As with sexual abuse of children and sex-
ual harassment in both the workplace and the military, the
physical environment and established power structures foster
opportunities for sexual abuse in prisons:
[M]ost sexual harassment takes place without witnesses be-
tween people of unequal power in a highly structured, hierar-
at 12A, available in 1997 WL 2640195 (stating that "some prison officials and hu-
man rights groups say that a source of the problem is the large number of men
guarding female prisoners"); Nancy Kurshan, Women and Imprisonment in the U.S.:
History and Current Reality (visited June 7, 1998) <http//www.igc.apc.orgjustice
prisons/womenlwomen-and-imprisoment.html> (noting that the rate of incarceration
of women has increased faster than that of men each year since 1981).
3. See infra notes 103-07, 109, and accompanying text (discussing Dr. Elizabeth
Morgan's observations and analysis of abused women's perceptions of men and of
themselves).
4. See ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 26-27; see also Terry Burns, Group
Urges Law Protection for Inmates[,] Calls Sexual Abuse by Guards, Officials Potential
Problem, STATE J. REG., Dec. 6, 1996, at 17, available in 1996 WL 13475540 (quot-
ing prison rights advocate Michael Mahoney, who stated that "[t]he Department of
Corrections, to their credit, has referred several of these cases to local prosecutors,
but they don't seem to be prosecuted").
5. Dan Morain, Sex in Prison - Too Often a Guard Plays a Role in Affair, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 1988, at 3, available in 1988 WL 229743 (quoting Jerry Williford,
Western Regional Director of the federal prison system).
6. See id.; see also Burns, supra note 4, at 17 (attributing the lack of document-
ed abuse cases "to the reluctance of inmates to come forward with charges because
they fear retaliation").
7. Morain, supra note 5, at 3.
1998] CLASS ACTIONS FOR CUSTODIAL SEXUAL ABUSE 325
chical organization. If there are no witnesses, the tendency of
most people in that organization, and in our society, will be
to believe the more highly-ranked and credentialed person in
any contest between the two as to what happened.'
The prison setting greatly magnifies this power disparity, and
women prisoners have no ability to escape from the abuse.
Prisoners face yet another problem in attempting to remedy
sexual abuse: custodial sexual abuse is a virtually invisible phe-
nomenon.9 Witnesses rarely observe the incidents, victims are
hesitant to make complaints, and the departments of corrections
often fail to record complaints or investigate them in an orga-
nized and centralized manner.'0 At the state and national level,
the prevalent misconduct by male guards is not apparent outside
of the prison system itself, and therefore is difficult to eradi-
cate." While suits under the Eighth Amendment against
8. Susan Deller Ross, Proving Sexual Harassment: The Hurdles, 65 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1451, 1451 (1992). Abuse of women prisoners also is comparable to child sexual
abuse, as both may be described as "form[s] of furtive violence committed against
vulnerable individuals." Lynne Henderson, Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse, 4
VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 479, 480 (1997). Both types of abuse also occur in a relation-
ship based on trust and authority. In child sexual abuse cases, this power disparity
allows the abuser to coerce the victim into silence by threats of harm if the victim
refuses to submit or discloses "the secret" of abuse. See Maria L. Imperial & Jeanne
B. Mullgrav, The Convergence Between Illusion and Reality: Lifting the Veil of Secre-
cy Around Childhood Sexual Abuse, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 135, 137-38
(1992). The same types of threats are likely to arise in the prisoner-guard relation-
ship when a guard sexually abuses a female inmate.
9. See Laurie A. Hanson, Comment, Women Prisoners: Freedom from Sexual Ha-
rassment - A Constitutional Analysis, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 667, 667 (1983)
(arguing that sexual harassment of female prisoners is so pervasive that it is invisi-
ble).
10. See ALL TOO FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 261-64.
11. See id. at 5.
In the Georgia and District of Columbia correctional systems, for exam-
ple, it took class action suits in 1992 and 1994, respectively, to make the
problem of sexual misconduct visible outside the confines of the correc-
tional system itself. Only after being sued did the departments of correc-
tions admit that the problem of custodial sexual misconduct existed in
their facilities for women and that reforms were needed. Sexual miscon-
duct is often so entrenched that, in those correctional systems where
class actions suits have not yet occurred or have only recently been initi-
ated, such abuse is still largely an invisible problem or one that the re-
spective correctional systems flatly deny.
Id. Corrections officers themselves are unaware of the severity and frequency of the
sexual abuse problems in prisons, as few incidents have been documented. See
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guards in their individual capacities 2 for monetary damages
have occasionally prevailed, these types of lawsuits have neither
acknowledged the problem of sexual abuse in America's prisons
nor offered solutions. Eighth Amendment suits for injunctive
relief against members of the prison administration in their offi-
cial capacities 13 or against the penal institution itself would at-
tract desperately needed visibility to custodial sexual abuse, but
these suits rarely have been successful. Instead, class action
suits under the Eighth Amendment have emerged as the best
option for prisoners wishing to obtain injunctive relief from cus-
todial abuse in American prisons.
Class action suits have many unique features that contribute
to the plaintiffs' success in achieving relief from sexual abuse
while incarcerated. For example, media coverage of such suits
attracts significant publicity. 4 Wide-spread national exposure
Holmes, supra note 2, at 12. . Harold Clarke, director of the Nebraska Department
of Corrections and president of the Association of State Corrections Administrators,
commented with concern on the situation: "In my home state, we haven't had one
complaint, and I'm certain that other agencies can say the same thing. I'm not sure
how extensive the problem is, but it is a problem that should be studied." Id.
12. A prisoner's suit against a guard in his individual capacity for a violation of
her Eighth Amendment rights may arise from the plaintiffs allegations that the
guard raped or otherwise sexually abused her. See, e.g., Carrigan v. Delaware, 957
F. Supp. 1376, 1390 (D. Del. 1997) (upholding an inmate's claim of gross negligence
against a guard despite the qualified immunity typically given to guards); Fisher v.
Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 174-75 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a guard's unwanted
sexual advances, while inappropriate and unacceptable, did not state a claim under
the Eighth Amendment).
13. "State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are not 'persons' for
purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that em-
ploys them. By contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity come to the court as
individuals." H.E. BARRINEAU III, CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 65 (2d ed.
1994) (citation omitted) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991)). A suit against
a guard or prison administrator in his official capacity for a violation of a prisoner's
Eighth Amendment rights might address, for example, the prison's responsibility for
implementing a policy allowing male guards to have unsupervised access and custody
of female inmates with deliberate indifference to the consequences, failing to train
the officers, or failing to supervise and protect. See, e.g., Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d
1063, 1065 (10th Cir. 1993) (extending qualified immunity to a situation in which an
officer was unaware that specific detention officers posed a threat to prisoners).
14. See D. Alan Rudlin, Packaging Toxic Tort Cases for Trial: Use of Test Cases,
Bifurcation and Class Actions, in PREPARING A TOXIC TORT CASE FOR TRIAL 1991, at
185, 279 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 406, 1991) ("A
class action with vast damage claims and/or particularly sympathetic plaintiffs at-
tracts media interest."); see also ALL TOO FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 135-37, 158
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in turn creates pressure for internal investigations within the
prison system and fosters external public awareness of the prob-
lem.15 Under the weight of this intense scrutiny, the depart-
ments of correction have allowed the involved officers to resign
or "retire" in order to end criticism of the prison and avoid pub-
lic embarrassment. 6 In fact, female inmates may consider the
removal or relocation of the "offending" officers as an additional
aspect of "relief."1 7 Defining the class bringing the suit as "all
women prisoners who are [currently] incarcerated in the ... cor-
rectional system... and all women prisoners who will hereafter
be incarcerated in the ... correctional system"8 enhances the
inmate's credibility and reduces the chance that the officer's ver-
sion will prevail over the inmate's version of events. 9 The vast
number of inmates coming forward with comparable stories of
sexual abuse makes it more difficult for the officers to claim that
the plaintiffs fabricated the allegations" or consented to the
sexual encounters.2'
(attributing the reforms in Georgia's policies regarding sexual abuse of prisoners to
the complaint filed in the class action suit Cason v. Seckinger, Civil Action File No.
84-313-1-MAC (M.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 1994) (granting permanent injunction), and the me-
dia attention that followed).
15. See ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 146.
16. See id. at 156-57; Neergaard, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that since the begin-
ning of Georgia's investigation of female inmates' accusations of sexual abuse, "eight
employees have been fired, seven others have resigned, four were transferred and
five were suspended in connection with the allegations").
17. The pattern of abuse is likely to continue if the offending officer remains in
contact with the female inmate he previously abused. See ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra
note 1, at 157-58, 188-90.
18. Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 638-39 (D.D.C.
1994), vacated in part, modified in part, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995), remanded
by 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997). While Judge
Green's original order for declaratory and injunctive relief in Women Prisoners has
been modified subsequent to her 1994 decision, "[aippellants have not challenged the
district court's findings that the sexual harassment ... rise[s] to the level of viola-
tions of the Eighth Amendment." Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 928.
19. See Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 642 ("When the evidence is reduced to
a dispute between an inmate's allegation and an employee's version of events, the
Defendants generally side with the employee.").
20. See ALL TOO FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing prison investigations in
the District of Columbia and five other states and noting that "in almost every case
of custodial sexual misconduct, correctional officials assumed that the prisoner lied
and thus refused, absent medical reports or witnesses who were not prisoners, to
credit prisoner testimony").
21. See Holmes, supra note 2, at 12A.
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Another beneficial aspect of a class action suit is that the com-
bined consideration of each female prisoner's complaint allows
courts to characterize the abuses as occurring in a "sexualized
environment"22 within the prison system instead of simply iso-
lated incidents happening on an individualized basis.' "[A] fo-
cus on 'the combined acts or omissions' of the state's agents,
rather than the search for a particular bad actor whose individu-
al culpability could support liability"24 also could lead to a
greater perception of harm by the courts and the public. This
Note suggests that the characterization of the harm as occurring
in a "sexualized environment" makes it easier for a class of fe-
male prisoner plaintiffs to satisfy the subjective prong of the
Eighth Amendment.25
The nature of the Eighth Amendment standard is the primary
reason for the seemingly insurmountable challenge facing the
inmate-plaintiff. The subjective prong of the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment analysis requires an inquiry into the state of
mind of the defendant-prison official, and the requisite state of
mind differs depending on the type of challenged act.26
Plaintiffs' claims of patterns of custodial sexual abuse constitute
"conditions of confinement"27  under the Court's Eighth
22. Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 639.
23. See id.
24. John Boston et al., Farmer v. Brennan: Defining Deliberate Indifference under
the Eighth Amendment, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 83, 99 (1994) (quoting Leer v.
Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also John Boston, Wilson v. Seiter:
A Preliminary Analysis, in 8 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATroRNEY FEES ANNUAL
HANDBOOK 41, 47-48 (Nat'l Lawyers Guild ed., 1992) (categorizing prisoners' suits for
injunctive relief as suits against the whole prison system for its "systemic deficien-
cies" and not against officials in their individual capacities).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ment inflicted." Id. (emphasis added). For a good discussion on the barrier faced by
women inmates in suits for custodial sexual abuse because of prison officials' claims
of qualified immunity, see Ashley E. Day, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment of
Female Inmates: The Need for Redress Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 555, 558 (1998). Day's proposed solution to the obstacles facing inmate plain-
tiffs is "a change in the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which would enable in-
jured female inmates a means to obtain legal redress." Id.
26. See, e.g., Boddie v. Schnieder 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that a
prison official's sexual abuse of a prisoner violated the Eighth Amendment when the
officer had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind").
27. See Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 663 (discussing Wilson v. Seiter, 501
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Amendment analysis.28 In "conditions of confinement" cases,
acting with "deliberate indifference" satisfies the definition of
"wanton"2 9 and therefore embodies "cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Eighth Amendment."" In a class ac-
tion, once the plaintiffs establish a pattern of abuse, courts then
may determine that the defendants acted with "deliberate indif-
ference" to the women prisoners' endurance of the condition of
sexual abuse. As this Note suggests, however, inmate-plaintiffs
proceeding individually actually have little opportunity to gain
injunctive relief under the Eighth Amendment.
This Note explores the implications of using the subjective
prong of the Eighth Amendment to bring claims to remedy cus-
todial sexual abuse. The first section analyzes the Eighth
Amendment framework established in Farmer v. Brennan,"' the
Supreme Court decision resolving the dispute over the test for
"deliberate indifference," and notes the harshness of this stan-
dard. The second section describes the pervasiveness of sexual
abuse in U.S. prisons and offers first-hand perspectives on its
nature and effects. The third section discusses several suits by
individual women inmates and offers explanations for the failure
of these actions. The fourth section explores Women Prisoners v.
District of Columbia32 and suggests why this particular class
action suit was successful. The fifth section questions whether
the existing Eighth Amendment standard poses an insurmount-
able obstacle to all inmate-plaintiffs except those involved in
class action suits alleging custodial sexual abuse, and also offers
possible solutions. This Note concludes that the level of proof re-
quired to satisfy the subjective "deliberate indifference" prong of
the Eighth Amendment is too demanding for individual prison-
ers to meet when they are suing for injunctive relief against
U.S. 294 (1991)).
28. See, e.g., Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 171-72 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Women
Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 663-67.
29. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
30. Fisher, 981 F. Supp. at 172.
31. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
32. 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part, modified in part, 899 F.
Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995), remanded by 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1552 (1997).
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prison administrators in their official capacities or against the
prison itself. This analysis ultimately determines that the pres-
ent standard has deterred women from coming forward with
allegations of abuse, and has created enormous obstacles for
those who have pursued their claims on an individual basis.
FARMER V. BRENNAN AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
The Eighth Amendment standard established by the Supreme
Court in Farmer v. Brennan has left inmate-plaintiffs in general,
and individual inmate-plaintiffs in particular, with little hope of
obtaining relief from custodial sexual abuse. Farmer provided
minimal support for future inmate-plaintiff cases because it in-
volved the claim of a single inmate and was ambiguous in its
exploration of the plaintiffs demand for injunctive relief.33
Farmer did, however, establish the current definition of "deliber-
ate indifference" as applied to "conditions of confinement" cas-
es. 4 While the Supreme Court has upheld the view that
"[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not 'part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society,' 35 Farmer and the preceding line of cases actually dem-
onstrated a shift away from concern for prisoners' safety.
The Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Gamble3" marked
the first major departure from the "hands-off' approach to prison
administration abuse issues arising from practices of incarcera-
tion.37 The Court concluded that "deliberate indifference to seri-
ous medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain."'38 Mere negligence was not enough to
make a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment,39 as "only
33. See Boston et al., supra note 24, at 96.
34. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825 (holding that prison officials are acting with "de-
liberate indifference" only when they know an inmate has a "substantial risk of
harm" and the official fails to act reasonably to minimize that risk).
35. Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
36. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The respondent-inmate in Estelle claimed that the prison
violated his Eighth Amendment rights by inadequately treating a back injury he
sustained while working in the prison. See id. at 100-01.
37. See David M. Siegal, Rape in Prison and AIDS: A Challenge for the Eighth
Amendment Framework of Wilson v. Seiter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1553-54 (1992).
38. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
39. See id. at 106.
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such [deliberate] indifference that can offend 'evolving standards
of decency"' was sufficient.0
In Rhodes v. Chapman4 the Court solidified the judicial role
in prison oversight by unequivocally declaring that
"'[c]onfinement in a prison... is a form of punishment subject
to [judicial] scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment stan-
dards." 2 The Court also recognized that the consideration of
prison conditions alone or in combination "may deprive inmates
of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities."43 This
realization was a necessary step in favor of prisoners' rights, as
the Rhodes Court observed that despite the "magnitude" and
"complexity" of the problems of prison administration, "[clourts
certainly have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and
unusual confinement.""
In Wilson v. Seiter," the Court elaborated on several doc-
trines established in earlier cases, and then departed from pre-
cedent by establishing an intent requirement.4" The Court re-
fused to accept the inmate's suggestion that it "should draw a
distinction between 'short-term' or 'one-time' conditions (in
which a state-of-mind requirement would apply) and 'continuing'
or 'systemic' conditions (where official state of mind would be
irrelevant)."47 The Supreme Court instead held that all "condi-
tions of confinement" cases require an inquiry into the state of
mind of the official in order to determine whether the official
40. Id.
41. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). In Rhodes, inmates brought a class action suit on behalf
of themselves and other similarly situated inmates, alleging that "double celling" of
confined inmates violated the Constitution. See id. at 339-41.
42. Siegal, supra note 37, at 1554 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345).
43. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
44. Id. at 352.
45. 501 U.S. 294 (1991). In Wilson, an inmate alleged Eighth Amendment viola-
tions based on poor conditions of confinement including "overcrowding, excessive
noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper
ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food
preparation, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates." Id. at 296. The
inmate sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and puni-
tive damages. See id.
46. See id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 300.
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acted with "deliberate indifference."45 In its refusal to recognize
the difference between "one-time" and "systemic" conditions, the
Court opined that there was no basis for drawing such a distinc-
tion4 and that such a distinction "defie[d] rational implementa-
tion.""
The Court's elaboration on the consideration of conditions "in
combination"5' was the only aspect of Wilson of any consolation
to the inmate-plaintiff.
Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth
Amendment violation "in combination" when each would not
do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing
effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable
human need .... Nothing so amorphous as "overall condi-
tions" can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment
when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.52
The opportunity to combine individual complaints is of great
value to inmate-plaintiffs, especially in the context of class ac-
tion suits.53
Justice White's concurrence in Wilson classified the majority
opinion as overreaching in its application of the "deliberate in-
difference" analysis to cases with systemic violations.54 He not-
ed that the majority's intent requirement departed from prece-
dent,5 and made it virtually impossible to apply in certain
cases:
Inhumane prison conditions often are the result of cumula-
tive actions and inactions by numerous officials inside and
48. See id. at 302-04.
49. See id. at 300.
50. Id. at 301.
51. Id. at 304 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
52. Id.
53. When multiple plaintiffs are united in a single class action suit, they have
access to a greater pool of resources, and they may be able to obtain more talented
and devoted attorneys. See Rudlin, supra note 14, at 279 ("Increased financial sup-
port and more capable plaintiffs' counsel make the task of defense more challenging
than in smaller, individual actions.").
54. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 306-11 (White, J., concurring).
55. See id. at 306 (White, J., concurring) ("[The majority's] reasoning disregards
our prior decisions that have involved challenges to conditions of confine-
ment . . ").
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outside a prison, sometimes over a long period of time. In
those circumstances, it is far from clear whose intent should
be examined, and the majority offers no real guidance on this
issue. 6
As Justice White asserted, such a muddled inquiry into a subjec-
tive intent standard is not very meaningful in practice when a
plaintiff challenges an entire prison system or staff.57
In Farmer v. Brennan,58 the Supreme Court defined "deliber-
ate indifference" as applied to "conditions of confinement" cases,
and left future inmate-plaintiffs with a seemingly insurmount-
able challenge in satisfying the subjective prong of the Eighth
Amendment. The plaintiff in Farmer was an inmate diagnosed
by the medical personnel of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
as a transsexual.59 She" was serving a twenty-year federal
sentence for credit card fraud. In accordance with the Federal
Bureau of Prisons' policy, Farmer was incarcerated in all-male
prisons,6' despite having noticeably feminine attributes after
undergoing estrogen therapy, silicone breast implants, and an
unsuccessful surgery attempt to have her testicles removed.62
On April 1, 1989, a prisoner approached Farmer, demanding
that she have sexual intercourse with him, and upon her refusal,
he forcibly raped her at knife point.63 "As a result of the rape,
Farmer suffered 'mental anguish, psychological damage,
humil[i]ation, a swollen face, cuts and bruises to her mouth and
lips and a cut on her back, as well as some bleeding.'"' Fanner
filed a Bivens action,65 seeking damages and an injunction from
56. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
57. See id. (White, J., concurring).
58. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
59. See id. at 829.
60. Although the majority opinion avoided applying any personal pronouns to
Farmer, "she prefer[red] to be referred to with feminine pronouns." Boston et al.,
supra note 24, at 84 & n.5.
61. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825.
62. See id. at 829.
63. See id. at 830.
64. Maijorie Rifkin, Farmer v. Brennan: Spotlight on an Obvious Risk of Rape in
a Hidden World, 26 COLUMi. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 273, 273-74 (1995) (quoting
Petitioner's Opening Brief at 5 & n.15, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (No.
92-7247)).
65. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcot-
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future confinement in any penitentiary.6 Farmer alleged that
the prison officials had acted with "deliberate indifference" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment by placing her in the general
prison population despite knowledge that "the penitentiary had
a violent environment and a history of inmate assaults, and...
[Farmer] would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack."67
In Farmer, the Supreme Court narrowed the relevant issue to
a choice between a civil or a criminal recklessness standard.68
Farmer urged the Court to adopt the more lenient civil law stan-
dard that defined recklessness'as acting, or failing to act,69 in
response to a high risk of harm that was either known, or so
obvious that it should have been known.70 As a general princi-
ple, the harsher criminal law standard only permitted a finding
of recklessness if a person disregarded a risk of which he was
personally aware.7 In defining the standard for "deliberate in-
difference," the Court in Farmer rejected the civil law standard
of recklessness and adopted the criminal law standard.72 The
Court held that it could not find a prison official liable under the
Eighth Amendment for denying a prisoner humane confinement
conditions unless the official actually knew of, and then disre-
garded, an "excessive" risk to the prisoner's health or safety.73
As the Court wrote: "the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." 4
ics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (providing a remedy for individuals deprived of their
constitutional rights by federal employees). Claimants must first demonstrate a de-
privation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
then must prove that the official acted under color of federal law in depriving the
claimant of that right. See John E. Nordin, II, The Constitutional Liability of Federal
Employees: Bivens Claims, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 342, 342 (1994) (explaining that a
Bivens claim may only be brought against federal employees in their individual ca-
pacities).
66. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 831.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 835-37.
69. A failure to act is relevant only where the person has a duty to act. See id.
70. See id. at 836-37.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 837.
73. See id.
74. Id.
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In essence, the only flexibility that remained for prisoners
after Farmer was that an official's knowledge of a risk could be
inferred from the existence of an "obvious risk to inmate health
or safety."75 As one scholar noted, "by allowing circumstantial
evidence of knowledge and not requiring prisoner notifica-
tion... [m]ore failure-to-protect cases are likely to reach the
jury."76 Inmates who allege that an obvious risk of harm exist-
ed within the prison may succeed in at least raising a reason-
able inference that the prison official had knowledge of the po-
tential risk of abuse. To prove obviousness, however, prisoners
need to produce concrete evidence of the harm.77 Otherwise, a
one-sided inquiry that weighs the prisoner's word against the
guard's will govern the determination of obviousness.7" If an in-
mate-plaintiff is able to combine her account of abuses with the
complaints of her fellow inmates, the obviousness of the harm
will be more difficult for a guard to challenge.
Justice Blackmun recognized the burden that the harsh crimi-
nal recklessness standard would place on prisoner-plaintiffs.
In his concurrence, Blackmun challenged the "deliberate indif-
ference" state of mind requirement in the context of systemic
abuses:
[B] arbaric conditions should not be immune from constitution-
al scrutiny simply because no prison official acted culpably.
Wilson failed to recognize that "state-sanctioned punishment
consists not so much of specific acts attributable to individual
state officials, but more of a cumulative agglomeration of ac-
tion (and inaction) on an institutional level." The responsibili-
ty for subminimal conditions in any prison inevitably is dif-
fuse, and often borne, at least in part, by the legislature."0
Farmer did not specifically address the issue of institutional lia-
bility, but the Court did recognize "considerable conceptual diffi-
75. Id. at 844.
76. Rifkdn, supra note 64, at 293-94.
77. See id. at 293.
78. See infra notes 148, 153, and accompanying text (noting that guards challeng-
ing prisoners' claims often argue that the sexual acts were consensual).
79. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 851-58 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 855 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting The Supreme
Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 243 (1991)).
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culty" in trying to ascertain the subjective state of mind of an
entire government entity, as distinguished from a single govern-
ment official.8
In suits for injunctive relief, however, courts have traditional-
ly held upper-level officials accountable for violations committed
by the lower-level staff, and have ultimately treated an "'official
capacity suit.., in all respects other than name... as a suit
against the entity."'82 The Court in Farmer, however, did not
adopt the section 198383 standard for "deliberate indifference"
put forth in City of Canton v. Harris.' Some commentators be-
lieve that the Court in Farmer recognized that "Canton's defini-
tion of deliberate indifference was an interpretation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a statute containing no independent state of mind re-
quirement. Canton itself had noted that the standard it an-
nounced for municipal liability did not turn on the standard gov-
erning the underlying constitutional claim."85 The test also
served a different purpose in Canton by "identifying the thresh-
old" for municipal liability.86 The Court in Farmer therefore
held that Canton did not govern the requirements of the subjec-
tive prong of the Eighth Amendment. Some may applaud the
decision to apply the strictest definition of "deliberate indiffer-
ence" for "send[ing] a clear message to prison officials that their
affirmative duty under the Constitution to provide for the safety
of inmates is not to be taken lightly."" Prisoner-plaintiffs, how-
81. Id. at 841.
82. Rifkin, supra note 64, at 300 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985)).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
84. 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (establishing that "deliberate indifference" is suffi-
cient to hold a municipality liable for a failure to train when the inadequacy "is so
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in violation of constitutional rights,
that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately
indifferent to the need").
85. Boston et al., supra note 24, at 88 (citations omitted). After Farmer, there are
now two standards for "deliberate indifference." This dichotomy is likely to create
confusion in the lower courts. See id. at 89. Cases addressing issues of supervisory
liability for sexual abuse of women inmates by their male guards will utilize both
the Farmer and Canton standards. This Note, however, focuses on the 'deliberate in-
difference" standard required for the underlying Eighth Amendment claim.
86. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124
(1992)).
87. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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ever, will be unlikely to share this positive outlook as this new
standard simply requires more proof and more tangible evi-
dence, resources that victims of sexual abuse often lack, espe-
cially when only one inmate's grievances are heard.
Justice Blackmun further criticized the majority opinion in his
concurrence in Farmer, recognizing that the holding was "funda-
mentally misguided; indeed it defies common sense.""8 He also
argued that "punishment does not necessarily always imply a
culpable state of mind on the part of an identifiable
punisher."9 "[Slevere, rough, or disastrous treatment"" may
constitute punishment of a prisoner regardless of whether the
punisher, such as a prison official, subjectively intended the
treatment to be cruel.91 Blackmun advocated overruling Wilson
v. Seiter 2 and argued that a violation of the Constitution
"'should turn on the character of the punishment rather than
the motivation of the individual who inflicted it.'"93 In his Wil-
son concurrence, Justice White predicted what would become the
aftermath of Farmer: "'serious deprivations of basic human
needs'.., will go unredressed due to an unnecessary and mean-
ingless search for 'deliberate indifference."'94 Justice White's
prediction has held true in many ways. The next section will
focus on these "deprivations" and their effects in greater detail
by considering the reality of sexual abuse of women inmates.
SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE PRISON ENVIRONMENT:
A VIEW FROM THE INSIDE
Sex in general, sex in particular, is the primary subject of
interest in here [in prison], for the [correctional officers] as
well as the inmates. I know a [correctional officer] who im-
88. Id. at 854 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
89. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
90. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
91. See id. at 854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1843 (1961)).
92. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
93. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 851 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 116 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
94. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
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pregnated both an inmate and another [correctional officer]
in a short space of time, while he was married to yet another.
He was found out, suspended for six months, and told he was
a naughty boy.5
For female inmates, several aspects of incarceration make the
problem of custodial sexual abuse a unique threat in desperate
need of a remedy. As argued earlier, custodial sexual abuse is
"invisible" to outsiders.96 The view from the other side of the
bars, however, provides a very different perspective.
A surprising percentage of women in prison share a history of
sexual abuse prior to incarceration. Statistics indicate that any-
where from forty to eighty-eight percent of these women have
been the victims of domestic violence and sexual or physical
abuse even before their arrival in prison.97 The American Cor-
rectional Association published a profile in 1990 indicating that
the typical female prisoner was sexually abused between the
ages of five and fourteen, usually by a male in her immediate
family.98 As a result of past abuse, many female prisoners fear
their male guards:
More than half the women in here have been sexually abused
at one time in their lives, some as small children by father,
uncle, granddad, mother's lover. They fear men, even despise
men. There are hookers who hate men. There are some very
young girls in here who are afraid to function in prison with-
out a "protector."99
As prior victims, incarcerated women become hypersensitized
to sexual abuse and often are more vulnerable to attacks in pris-
on. "[Slexual abuse is an important consideration when you look
95. JEAN HARRIS, "THEY ALWAYS CALL US LADIES": STORIES FROM PRISON 115-16
(1988).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
97. See ALL TOO FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 19; see also Lynn Smith, Majority of
State's Women Inmates Abused as Children, Warden Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1992, at 5, available in 1992' WL 2937221 (stating that "the average female offender
reports a typical pattern of violence or sexual abuse in their original homes").
98. See Lisa Krim, A Reasonable Woman's Version of Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment: Cross-Gender, Clothed-Body Searches of Women Prisoners, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 85, 112-13 (1995).
99. HARRIS, supra note 95, at 116.
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at incarcerated women."' A history of sexual abuse has an
enormous impact on how these women respond to incarceration.
Through their relationships with male guards, women who have
experienced sexual abuse often re-live the trauma and suffer
flashbacks of prior abuse, particularly when the male guards
search them and perform pat-frisks.' Incarcerated women re-
spond to abusive male authority in prison in the same manner
as they did before their confinement in prison. "The women are
so needy and in need of love, they are set up for oppression. The
only way they know is to exchange their bodies [to meet this
need]. " "2 From her observations while incarcerated in a Dis-
trict of Columbia prison, Elizabeth Morgan shares the view that
a prior history of abuse affects the behavior and perceptions of
female inmates.' Arguing that "the [f]ear of male violence
and the need to be safe are central to women's experiences," 4
Morgan suggests that the prison environment serves to exacer-
bate these perspectives. She notes that "[b]eliefs about life and
about oneself are profoundly affected by survival of traumatic
events."' '5 Women inmates share largely negative outlooks.
Morgan suggests that these women simply have no experiences
that enable them to envision "any positive outcome for them-
selves in any [type of] situation involving men."' Clinical
studies have suggested that battered women should be provided
with safe experiences in order to take the first step in changing
their beliefs about their own lack of power.' 7 Not only do pris-
ons fail in their attempt to change these women's beliefs, but the
women inmates become entrapped in a different, and seemingly
100. ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 19 (quoting clinical psychologist Christine
Kampfner).
101. See id.; see also Krim, supra note 98, at 113-14 (noting that past sexual abuse
may influence how body searches performed by male guards affect women inmates).
102. ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 19-20 (quoting psychologist Christine
Kampfner).
103. See Elizabeth Morgan, The Psychology of a Failing Jail: Jail as an Abusive
and Sexually Abusive Foster 'Family" for "Children" with Multiple Trauma-Impli-
cations for Rehabilitation 163-79 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Can-
terbury (New Zealand)) (on file with author).
104. Id. at 175.
105. Id. at 177.
106. Id.
107. See id.
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inescapable cycle of abuse.' "The jail ... provide[s] yet more
proof that they [a]re powerless to change.""0 9
In Jordan v. Gardner,"' the Ninth Circuit finally acknowl-
edged and documented the fact that many women inmates have
a history of sexual abuse."' The court noted that the psycho-
logical impact of clothed body searches by male prison guards of
women inmates with a history of sexual abuse amounted to an
"infliction of pain.""' The Court in Jordan recognized that
women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual as-
sault, and therefore have a stronger incentive to be concerned
with and sensitive to sexual behavior. "Men, who are rarely
victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum
without a full appreciation of the social setting or the underlying
threat of violence that a woman may perceive.""'
When combined with the abusive pasts of women inmates, the
retention of powerful positions by male guards fosters an oppor-
tunity for continued abuse."' Simply put, "[plolice officers have
relatively frequent opportunities for sexual harassment and sex-
ual contact with offenders. Offenders are not only aware of the
authority of the officer but are also in a position where their
complaints may be disregarded or played down."" 5 The fact
108. Murphy Davis, the Georgia state director of Southern Prison Ministries, has
attributed a major part of the problem of sexual abuse to the fact that the prisons
are run almost exclusively by white men:
Men are the women's keepers and completely control their present and
their futures. That is an invitation to abuse .... This is as exaggerated,
as distorted, a power relationship as you can get. You literally have peo-
ple who have keys and power who have control over women who have
absolutely no power.
Eric Harrison, Nearly 200 Women Have Told of Being Raped, Abused in a Georgia
Prison Scandal So Broad Even Officials Say It's... a 13-Year Nightmare, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1992, at 1, available in 1992 WL 2821314.
109. Morgan, supra note 103, at 177.
110. 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
111. See id. at 1525 ("Eighty-five percent of the inmates report a history of serious
abuse to . . . counselors, including rapes, molestations, beatings, and slavery.").
112. Id. at 1526.
113. Id. at 1526 n.5 (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991)).
114. One woman prisoner identified this abusive use of power in describing the
guard who allegedly raped her: "I hate him. He used his power against many wom-
en in that prison. He used us like we were whores." Harrison, supra note 108, at 1.
115. THOMAS BARKER & DAVID L. CARTER, POLICE DEVIANCE 144 (2d ed. 1991).
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that the guards literally control the lives of the inmates, includ-
ing ultimately how long the actual period of confinement will be,
adds to the power the guards have over the inmates."6 The on-
ly "bargaining power" women have is their bodies." 7
Women inmates have come to accept the reality that there is
no way to avoid sexual abuse. They also fear that somehow they
-ultimately will receive punishment for reporting the abuse, in-
stead of the guard receiving punishment for inflicting it. In the
words of one inmate:
"There's not much I can do about it... If I write it up, first
thing they are going to do is not believe me, then it's PCU
[Protective Custody Unit] and then a transfer. Thats how it
goes with sexual misconduct.... There are so many females
back there that this happens to and they don't tell. They do
not want to speak ... It's the fear ... they're scared ... I'm
tired of being scared. I'm tired of things not being done."'
Women inmates' fears of retribution and endurance of accusa-
tions that they are lying when they report abuse only have con-
tributed to the external invisibility of custodial sexual abuse.
The prison administration often has ignored or dismissed indi-
vidual incidents of sexual abuse,". but when viewed in com-
bination with other incidents, these occurrences reveal a "sexual-
ized environment" inside the prison walls. The prison emerges
as a psychologically destructive setting in which abuse continu-
ally plagues hypersensitized inmates: "Each example of harass-
ment is petty. Piled one on top of another they can become what
nervous breakdowns are made of, an obsession, the last misera-
116. See Morain, supra note 5, at 3 ("There's an awful lot that a woman can lose.
If they don't cooperate or if a situation becomes unfriendly, they can lose their (re-
lease) dates." (quoting Ellen M. Barry, a San Francisco prison rights lawyer)).
117. See, e.g., Dennis J. Opatrny, 3 Women Sue, Allege Sex Slavery in Pris-
on-Warden, Guards at East Bay Facility Among the Accused, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept.
29, 1996, at C1, available in 1996 WL 3718387 (quoting a former inmate as saying
"about one-third of women in prison trade sex with guards for favors, some as small
as packages of gum or small vials of perfume. The other two-thirds live with con-
stant harassment to do the same.").
118. ALL TOO FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 195 (quoting an interview with a female
inmate).
119. See Morgan, supra note 103, at 177-78 (noting that the administration failed
to control sexually aggressive male guards).
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ble straw."2 ' The lack of privacy inherent in a prison environ-
ment necessarily means that women are exposed and vulnerable
on a twenty-four-hour basis. While in prison, women inmates
"are in a position where sexual harassment behaviors can take
place with relative impunity." 2' Jails are not constructed with
the privacy of inmates as a major concern. Male guards may
observe prisoners undressed in their cells, showers, toilets, or
during searches by jail matrons. "Some officers apparently seek
out opportunities to observe females in various degrees of un-
dress."'22 After a while, the constant exposure of women's bod-
ies and the sexual relations between inmates and staff become
accepted occurrences.' 2' "You get the impression from the [pris-
on] staff.., that it was a sexual smorgasbord and they could
pick and choose whom they wanted."2
After experiencing incarceration in the District of Columbia,
Elizabeth Morgan noted some of the effects of the sexualized
environment existing in women's prisons. She first characterized
the prison administration as functioning as a "'mind control'
sexual abuser."'25 Aside from making the prisoners relive their
past histories of sexual abuse, this sexualized environment forc-
es the inmates to acquire defensive tactics to protect themselves:
"Entries [in Morgan's diary] described female inmates who re-
fused to shower because it required exposing themselves to men
a few feet away who were screaming sexual obscenities, insults,
and threats. Women inmates also tried to use poor personal hy-
giene to diminish the risk of rape."'26 Although women prison-
ers were able to develop certain defensive tactics, none of these
responses successfully directed the administration's attention to
the sexual abuse, so patterns of abuse continued unnoticed.
Sexual abuse of women prisoners by their male guards unfor-
tunately has become an accepted reality. Prison administrators
120. HARRIS, supra note 95, at 234.
121. BARKER & CARTER, supra note 115, at 145.
122. Id.
123. See ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 138.
124. Id. (quoting Bob Cullen, a legal services attorney representing inmates in a
class action lawsuit).
125. Morgan, supra note 103, at 178.
126. Id. at 96.
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"allowed this whole culture of abuse (to develop). Abuse was OK.
It didn't matter .... Everybody became sort of inoculated to the
abuse that was ongoing."'27 The victims of sexual abuse in
prison are silent for several reasons. They fear that no one will
believe them," that prison officials will punish them,'29 or
they simply blame themselves for somehow provoking the
abuse. 30 The few inmates who have recently come forward
with individual allegations of abuse have lost in court and have
been subject to retaliation by prison staff,3' thereby deterring
other victims of sexual abuse from breaking their silence. An
inquiry into the circumstances and the reasons for the failures of
recent custodial sexual abuse claims under the Eighth
Amendment by individual inmates demonstrates why other vic-
tims perceive such a grim chance for relief.
THE UNSUCCESSFUL CASES AND THE DANGERS INHERENT IN
BRINGING AN INDIVIDUAL CLAIM
This section focuses on key cases brought in the federal courts
since 1995 where the individual inmate-plaintiff unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain relief against prison supervisors in their
official capacities by instituting claims for sexual abuse under
the Eighth Amendment. In each of these cases, the plaintiff was
unable to satisfy the subjective prong of her Eighth Amendment
claim because of her inability to show that the prison supervi-
sors acted with "deliberate indifference." The myriad of failed
cases suggests that the "deliberate indifference" standard is too
demanding for an individual plaintiff to overcome in actions
against prison officers in their official capacities.
In Downey v. Denton County,"2 an employee of the county
sheriffs department sexually assaulted an inmate when they
were left alone for nearly two hours, unmonitored and unsuper-
vised, in a room with a disconnected voice-activated security
127. Harrison, supra note 108, at 1 (quoting attorney Bob Cullen).
128. See id.
129. See ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 210-11, 259-63, 313-15.
130. See Judith I. Avner, Sexual Harassment: Building a Consensus for Change, 3
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 57, 58 (1994).
131. See supra notes 4, 6 and accompanying text.
132. 119 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1997).
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device. 33 Downey gave birth to a child as a result of the inci-
dent.14 Downey filed suit against Denton County, the offend-
ing officer, and several supervisory officers.'35 With respect to
the plaintiffs section 1983 claims, the district court granted the
county and supervisory officers' motion for judgment on partial
findings, yet denied the offending officer's motion for the
same.
136
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that the trial court
did not err in granting the county and supervisory officers' mo-
tion for judgment on partial findings." 7 It upheld the trial
court's decision that there was no evidence in the record to sup-
port a finding of "deliberate indifference" as outlined in Farmer
v. Brennan.13' The court further held that the trial judge did
not clearly err in his findings of fact to the effect that the plain-
tiff failed to show sufficient direct evidence that Sheriff Robin-
son, one of the supervisory officers, actually was aware of a
substantial risk of harm to Downey, or that he disregarded this
risk."9 The court concluded that "[allthough requisite knowl-
edge of a substantial risk of serious harm can be demonstrated
by inference from circumstantial evidence, a survey of the trial
record convinces us that there is no evidence of such knowledge
on the part of Sheriff Robinson.""'
In Carrigan v. Delaware,' plaintiff Dorothy Carrigan filed
suit against the State of Delaware, the offending officer, the
133. See id. at 384.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 389.
138. See id. at 386.
139. See id.
140. Id. In prior cases, courts had framed the actual risk in such general terms
that the obvious or substantial nature of the risk would be difficult for an individual
inmate-plaintiff to prove through factual evidence. See, e.g., Hovater v. Robinson, 1
F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 1993). In Hovater, the court refused to frame the risk in terms
of whether the supervisory officials had prior notice of sexual misconduct between
the offending officer and female inmates. See id. at 1066. The court instead held
that in order to find that an obvious and substantial risk was present, "it must con-
clude that a male guard having sole custody of a female inmate creates such a risk
to her safety that it constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendments cruel and
unusual punishment clause." Id. The court in Hovater was unable to make that find-
ing. See id.
141. 957 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Del. 1997).
142. Following the officer's arrest on charges of "engaging in sex in a detention
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Delaware Department of Corrections, and several administrative
officials in both their individual and official capacities.
14 3
Carrigan claimed that Peter Davis, the offending officer, entered
her room while she was taking a nap, woke her, told her to be
quiet, and then raped her.44 Carrigan reported the incident,
and claimed that during the investigation, officers threatened
her with additional jail time and prosecution under a law pro-
hibiting sex in prison." 5 She also claimed that the prison
transferred her from a minimum security unit to a maximum
security unit in retaliation for reporting the incident. "6
Carrigan subsequently attempted suicide as a result of the in-
tense pressure she experienced after reporting the rape. 47 De-
fendant Davis eventually "admitted to having oral sex with
[Carrigan], but claimed that [she] seduced him and the act was
consensual." " Carrigan remarked that the retaliation against
her by other guards continued even after Davis admitted to
engaging in oral sex." 9
In analyzing "deliberate indifference" as defined in Farmer,
the court concluded that unlike the plaintiff in Farmer, the
plaintiff in Carrigan failed to establish additional facts sufficient
for a reasonable jury to conclude that the conditions of her con-
finement posed a "substantial risk of serious harm" and that the
Administrative Defendants 50 acted with "deliberate indiffer-
ence" to her health and safety. The court in Carrigan noted that
[plaintiffs brief is replete with rumors and innuendos of sex-
ual impropriety between inmates and prison guards designed
facility," he resigned. Id. at 1380.
143. See id. at 1379.
144. See id. at 1380.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See Holmes, supra note 2, at 12A ("'I got beat up the other day,' [Carrigan]
said. 'I don't care what anybody tells me, because I wasn't doing nothing. I got beat
up behind this case.'").
150. The term "Administrative Defendants" collectively referred to Stanley Taylor,
former Chief of the Bureau of Prisons and present Commissioner of Correction for
the State of Delaware; Grace Martin, Deputy Warden; Tom Baylor, Internal Affairs
Officer for the Department of Corrections; and Jack Sines, Internal Affairs Officer
for the Department of Corrections. See Carrigan, 957 F. Supp. at 1379.
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to illustrate that the Administrative Defendants were aware
of a risk of sexual assault to Plaintiff; however, these allega-
tions are insufficient to establish that the Administrative De-
fendants were aware of a risk of harm to Plaintiff.15
The court further distinguished Carrigan from the plaintiff in
Farmer, by asserting that Carrigan had failed to give the Ad-
ministrative Defendants advance notice of the risk of harm, and
did not present other sufficient evidence to support her
claim. 52 The court, however, based its finding on the fact that
Carrigan's allegation of rape was the first rape claim brought to
the Administrative Defendants' attention. 153 The court errone-
ously assumed that inmates actually report most rape or sexual
abuse incidents, while in reality the exact opposite is true. 54
The court's refusal to rely on a correctional officer's affidavits de-
scribing rumors about additional incidents of sexual
misconduct 5 also ignored the reality that only a small per-
centage of women, on both sides of the prison wall, report such
occurrences.
In addition, the court pointed to the Department of Correc-
tions Code of Conduct that strictly forbids "'[any sexual contact
with offenders,' ' as well s the additional training guards re-
151. Id. at 1382.
152. See id.
153. See id. Interestingly, another inmate in the same prison reported being raped
by a different male guard on the day after Carrigan was attacked. See Holmes,
supra note 2, at 12A. State officials in that case also argued that the sex was con-
sensual. See id. The inmate, Valerie Daniels, gave birth to a child as a result of the
rape, and also claimed that she was subjected to retaliation by prison officials after
reporting the incident. See id.
154. See Hanson, supra note 9, at 670; see also Avner, supra note 130, at 58 (not-
ing that 95% of all victims of sexual harassment do not make formal complaints).
155. See Carrigan, 957 F. Supp. at 1382.
156. Id. at 1383 (emphasis added) (quoting DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORREC-
TIONS OFFICER CODE OF CONDUCT A-169). The mere existence of such a policy does
not, however, establish an obvious risk of sexual contact between male guards and
female inmates. The court in Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 1993),
held that the jail's manual setting forth procedures to keep male guards from having
unsupervised care of female inmates did not establish an obvious risk that male
guards are likely to assault female inmates when they are left alone with them. See
id. at 1068. The court in Hovater instead preferred the defendants' argument that
the policy was adopted to "protect male guards from false complaints." Id. But see
GREG A. NAYLOR, A SUPERVISOR'S GUIDE TO PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 57
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ceive, to suggest that the prison maintained a practice of "care-
ful attention, rather than deliberate indifference to correctional
officer training."15 7 The court ultimately granted the Adminis-
trative Defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding
that simply because the "[p]laintiff may have suffered [as a
result of sexual contact] does not indicate that the Administra-
tive Defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference toward her
mental and physical health."'58
In Adkins v. Rodriguez,'59 the plaintiff, Shelly Adkins,
brought an Eighth Amendment claim against Deputy Rodriguez,
the offending officer, and other county officials in their official
capacities. 6 ' The trial court dismissed her complaint, finding
no right under the Eighth Amendment for a prisoner to be free
from verbal sexual harassment. 6' Adkins claimed that Rodri-
guez verbally harassed her and appeared in her cell without
authorization.6 ' Rodriguez allegedly "made verbal comments
to Ms. Adkins about her body, his own sexual prowess, and his
sexual conquests," and continued to make such comments even
after being warned by prison officials to stop his inappropriate
behavior." On one occasion, Rodriguez entered Adkins's cell
in the middle of the night, and when she awoke to find him
standing beside her bed, he said, "[bly the way, you have nice
breasts."""' After being threatened with termination, Rodri-
guez ultimately resigned.'65 Adkins argued that Rodriguez's
acts violated her rights "to be free from threats of violence and
sexual assault and/or sexual intimidation, to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment, [and] to be free from unjustified ha-
rassment."'66
(1996) (noting that "anti-dating" or "anti-fraternization" policies are designed to avoid
"the potential for [any] sex harassment charges").
157. Carrigan, 957 F. Supp. at 1383.
158. Id. at 1385.
159. 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1995).
160. See id. at 1035.
161. See id. at 1036.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 1035-36.
164. Id. at 1036.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 1037.
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On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Focusing on the
fact that Rodriguez did not actually touch Adkins, the court con-
cluded that, "we cannot infuse defendant's words of sexual ha-
rassment with the sort of violence or threats of violence cogni-
zable in the conditions of confinement cases the [Supreme] Court
has addressed."" 7 The court, however, seemed to suggest that
because the plaintiffs complaint only concerned an isolated inci-
dent, Adkins could not establish a constitutional violation."' 8
The court implied that an individual incident of sexual harass-
ment or sexual abuse, regardless of the nature or severity of the
attack, would not constitute deliberate indifference. 69
A recent, well-documented, and highly-publicized case, Fisher
v. Goord 70 popularly known as the "Amy Fisher" case, fol-
lowed the pattern of inmate-plaintiffs' inability to satisfy the
"deliberate indifference" standard in suits against prison super-
visors in their official capacities. Fisher alleged that while incar-
cerated in a New York prison, several corrections officers raped
and sexually abused her.171 She also claimed that prison au-
thorities failed to act on her complaints, and that they retaliated
against her as a result of her charges.'72 Fisher named as de-
fendants seven present or former corrections officers at the pris-
on, 17 several high ranking officials in the Department of Cor-
rectional Services, and a number of supervisory officers at the
prison. 74 Fisher filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,
167. Id.
168. See id. at 1038 (stating that Adkins "did not establish the single invasion of
her cell constituted the deliberate indifference required for a violation of her Eighth
Amendment rights" (emphasis added)).
169. See id.
170. 981 F. Supp. 140 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
171. See id. at 145-51.
172. See id. at 143.
173. Three of the corrections officers who allegedly raped and sexually abused Fish-
er had either resigned or been reassigned to other prisons prior to the trial. See id.
The only prison official actually linked to the alleged rape through physical evidence
"suddenly quit his job at Albion three days after her lawsuit was filed in July and
left town after 18 years on the job." Michael Beebe & Dan Herbeck, Amy Fisher
Stirs Concern with Testimony, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 25, 1996, at B1, available in
1996 WL 5868979.
174. See Fisher, 981 F. Supp. at 143.
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seeking an order requiring her transfer to Danbury prison dur-
ing the pendency of the action and an order requiring one of the
defendant-officers to provide a blood sample.'75 A party seeking
a preliminary injunction must show that she will suffer irrep-
arable harm in the absence of an injunction and demonstrate
either: "(1) a likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficient-
ly serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair
ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decid-
edly in the movant's favor."76
On the likelihood of succeeding on the merits, the district
court held that Fisher had failed to establish a clear or substan-
tial likelihood of success on her Eighth Amendment sexual
abuse claims.'77 After the court considered the testimony dur-
ing trial and the other evidence in the record, it found that
Fisher's claims of rape and sexual abuse were not worthy of
belief.7 ' "Neither Fisher nor her mother was a credible wit-
ness and their testimony was contradicted both by other wit-
nesses ... and other evidence in the record." 7 ' The court at-
tacked Fisher's credibility and suggested that it "appears that
[Fisher] and her mother are trying to manipulate the system by
capitalizing on this sensitive and important issue."80 The court
further criticized Fisher's case because she failed to present any
witnesses to the rapes or sexual abuse.'8 ' Judge Arcara also re-
marked that Fisher did not come across in court as the type of
individual who had been the victim of multiple rapes.'82
The fact that New York had not yet established a law man-
dating that sexual relations of any kind between a corrections
officer and an inmate constitutes statutory rape presented a dif-
ficult challenge to Fisher's claim.8 3 Although New York now
175. See id.
176. Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996).
177. See Fisher, 981 F. Supp. at 172.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 172.
180. Id. at 176.
181. See id. at 150.
182. See id. The court referred to Fisher's "matter of fact" and general description
of the incidents as contributing to this conclusion. See id. Therapists, however, have
recognized that it is common for victims of sexual abuse to reveal as little as possi-
ble about the incident because it makes them "re-live" the experience. See WILLIAM
E. PRENDERGAST, THE MERRY-GO-ROUND OF SEXUAL ABUSE: IDENTIFYING AND TREAT-
ING SURVIVORS 94 (1993).
183. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(e) (Consol. 1996). Likewise, in the District of
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has such a law, it was not in effect at the time of the alleged
misconduct in Fisher."s As a result, the court found that
Fisher's sexual relationships with the defendants "can only rea-
sonably be interpreted as... consensual in nature."' Accord-
ing to the court, even if her testimony was true, Fisher was
unable to affirmatively demonstrate a lack of consent.'86
The court supported the consent defense by applying a recent
Eighth Circuit decision to the facts of Fisher's case. In Freitas v.
Ault,"'87 an inmate brought a section 1983 action against a war-
den and prison employee, alleging sexual harassment in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment.' The Eighth Circuit in Freitas
affirmed the district court's determination that the relationship
between the inmate and the prison employee was consensual,
and noted that "[t]he record contained no evidence, other than
[the inmate's] unsubstantiated assertions, supporting his claim
that he succumbed to [the employee's] advances because she was
his boss and he feared the possible negative consequences of re-
porting her actions."8 ' Fisher argued, in response to Freitas,
that there was a "power discrepancy" between guard and in-
mate, "making it impossible for an inmate to ever truly consent
to having sexual relations with a correction officer,"'90 but the
court did not find this argument persuasive.
Columbia, sexual intercourse and sexual contact with a person in custody were not
explicitly made felony offenses until just after the court rendered its decision in
Women Prisoners. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4113(1), 22-4114(1) (1996); see also in-
fra text accompanying notes 235-36 (discussing the District of Columbia's response to
Women Prisoners).
184. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(e) did not go into effect until 1996-after the sex-
ual encounters between the prison guard and Fisher, which occurred between 1992
and 1995.
185. Fisher, 981 F. Supp. at 174.
186. See id.
187. 109 F.3d 1335 (8th Cir. 1997).
188. See id. at 1336.
189. Freitas, 109 F.3d at 1339; see also Fisher, 981 F. Supp. at 174 (using identical
language in describing plaintiffs failure to prove her case).
190. Fisher, 981 F. Supp. at 174-75. This argument acknowledges the dynamics of
the prison setting and the amplified power and control a guard has over an inmate.
See ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 284 n.13 ("Where you have power over a
person, it cannot be consensual . . . ."); Hanson, supra note 9, at 685 ("Sexual rela-
tionships between inmates and guards are the product of sexual exploitation and
cannot be defined as voluntary.").
19981 CLASS ACTIONS FOR CUSTODIAL SEXUAL ABUSE 351
Even though the court in Fisher did not accept that the "pow-
er discrepancy" demonstrated a lack of consent, it still labeled
these types of sexual relations as inappropriate:
Sexual interactions between correction officers and inmates,
no matter how voluntary, are totally incompatible with the
order and discipline required in a prison setting. Further, the
court is disturbed by the notion that an inmate might feel
compelled to perform sexual favors for correction officers in
order to be on the officer's "good side." Such quid pro quo be-
havior is inappropriate, despicable and serves no legitimate
penological purpose.' 9'
Judge Arcara seemed to recognize that sexual relations between
inmates and guards constitutes bad prison policy, but failed to
consider the inmate's perspective on such relationships.'92
Within the walls of a prison, the inmate becomes comparable to
a victim of child sexual abuse. In both situations, two key fac-
tors of sexual abuse are present: "a bigger and more powerful
person used his/her strength or authority over a smaller, weaker
and more vulnerable individual," and the victim was unable "to
resist, and therefore.., there was no real or true choice in the
matter."9 3
Recognizing the implications of his ruling that a prisoner may
consent to sex with a guard, Judge Arcara concluded with a dis-
claimer: "The Court['s] ... decision here should not be viewed as
a ringing endorsement of the situation at Albion. Despite the
Court's determination that Fisher's claims of rape and sexual
abuse are not credible, there are indications that all is not right
at Albion." 94 Amy Fisher did not necessarily lose her case be-
cause of her reputation or her lack of credibility; rather, her fail-
ure likely is attributable to the reality that as an individual
plaintiff, she could not offer enough proof of sexual abuse in
Albion to prevail.
Fisher's tabloid notoriety created a great deal of media atten-
tion and several commentators noted the implications of the de-
191. Fisher, 981 F. Supp. at 175.
192. See id.
193. PRENDERGAST, supra note 182, at 4.
194. Fisher, 981 F. Supp. at 176.
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cision. Fisher's lawyer, Glenn Murray, reacted to Judge Arcara's
ruling by stating, "'I'm afraid that with this decision... the
(Department of Correctional Services) won't take rape accusa-
tions more seriously, but rather, less seriously, if such a thing is
imaginable.""95 Supporters of Judge Arcara's verdict accused
Fisher of tarnishing the name of Albion by questioning the in-
tegrity of its officers. 9 ' Others viewed the whole suit as entire-
ly fabricated by Fisher in order to obtain a transfer to Bedford
Hills prison.'97 A union official representing Albion's guards
claimed "[sihe dragged down a whole lot of people who worked
at Albion who had absolutely nothing to do with this ... . The
only reason for this lawsuit... is a book or a movie deal that
will come out afterward."198
Regardless of their interpretation of Judge Arcara's ruling,
commentators agreed that the decision would impact the prison
system. As Roger Gangi, executive director of the Correctional
Association of New York observed: "It's definitely no joke... I'm
not making any judgments about [Fisher's] accusations, but
195. Michael Beebe & Dan Herbeck, Fishers Lawyer Says Arcara's Ruling Will Dis-
courage Inmate Reports of Jail Rape, BUFFALO NEWS, July 17, 1997, at E2, available
in 1997 WL 6448922.
196. See Michael Beebe, Union President Says Fisher Ruling Restores Reputation of
Albion Prison, BUFFALO NEWS, July 18, 1997, at C4, available in 1997 WL 6449129.
197. See id. (quoting a spokesman for the New York State Department of Correc-
tional Services who felt that Fisher filed her lawsuit only after first attempting to
threaten legal action if prison officials did not transfer her to Bedford Hills).
198. Id. As a result of Fisher's notoriety and spotlight in the media, she was able
to attract public scrutiny to the conditions in Albion much in the same way other
prisoners have in the wake of class action suits. In December 1997, the Women in
Correctional Facilites Committee of the New York Bar Association urged Governor
Pataki's administration to bolster efforts to prevent future sexual abuse of women in
the state's penitentiaries. See Joel Stashenko, Panel Says Prison Guards Abuse Pow-
er Over Female Inmates, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 26, 1997, at A12, available in 1997
WL 6482765. The Committee recognized that sexual abuse of women inmates "was
and is a real problem" and that "an ongoing abuse of power by the guards, coupled
with sexual relations between guards and inmates is a sure recipe for disaster." Id.
Caitlin Barghmann, the Committee's chairwoman, further noted that "[b]ecause the
guards are in a position of authority, they are the ones who need to learn to ad-
dress the relationship and handle it properly." Id. The Committee's statements, of-
fered just a few months after Judge Arcara rendered his decision in the Amy Fisher
case, demonstrate how celebrity status, like class action suits, attracts public atten-
tion to the problem of sexual abuse inside the prison walls. Widespread awareness is
the first step toward finding a solution.
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things like this do happen in the state prisons."'99 Despite her
notoriety, however, even Fisher was unable to generate enough
media scrutiny to actually remedy the problems of sexual abuse
in New York prisons.
WOMEN PRISONERS AND THE SUCCESS OF CLASS ACTION SUITS
The ruling in Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia °. had
two major effects on Eighth Amendment litigation for claims of
custodial sexual abuse. First, it attracted necessary recognition
of the pervasiveness of the problem. Second, the plaintiffs' suc-
cess suggested at least one possible method through which in-
mate-plaintiffs might satisfy the subjective prong of the Eighth
Amendment. In Women Prisoners, women inmates in the Dis-
trict of Columbia (D.C.) prisons brought a class action suit
against the District of Columbia, its Department of Corrections
(DCDC), the District of Columbia General Hospital Commission,
and numerous District officials, all in their official capaci-
ties.2"' Among their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief,
the plaintiffs alleged that women prisoners in the D.C. prisons
were subjected to sexual harassment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment." 2
One noticeable benefit of using a class action suit was the
plaintiffs' ability to mount a more "exhaustively-prepared
case."0 ' The trial itself lasted three weeks and included the
submission of close to nine hundred exhibits and hundreds of
pages of transcript and deposition testimony.0 4 Prisoner testi-
mony revealed allegations of sexual assault, sexual harassment,
the inadequacy of the corrections officers' responses, and retalia-
tion by the guards after complaints were filed. 5 Women took
the stand and told of rapes, forced sodomy, sexual touching, and
199. Beebe & Herbeck, supra note 173, at B1.
200. 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part, modified in part, 899 F.
Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995), remanded by 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1552 (1997).
201. See id. at 639.
202. See id.
203. Rudlin, supra note 14, at 278.
204. See Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 638.
205. See id. at 639-40.
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fondling."' 6 In addition to this physical abuse, the women in-
mates complained of a lack of privacy stemming from the ability
of male guards and fellow inmates to view the women in various
states of undress."7 The women inmates also described how
they were subjected to sexually explicit comments and verbal
sexual harassment.2"8
As a class, the inmate-plaintiffs benefitted from being able to
present expert testimony on the effects of sexual abuse on wom-
en inmates, especially those with prior histories of sexual
abuse.0 ' Dr. Susan Fiester testified that among the population
of women in prison, "between 70 to 80 percent have been sexual-
ly abused at some point in their lives."210 In addition to the
harmful physical and psychological effects of sexual abuse and
sexual harassment on women prisoners,21' Dr. Fiester ex-
plained that those with backgrounds of abuse suffered even
further.212 For these women, the recent episodes of sexual
abuse or sexual harassment brought flashbacks of prior abuse,
which could lead to severe depression, reinforcement of a 'victim'
self-image and a belief that, as in childhood, they have no con-
trol over their lives."21
Witnesses for the plaintiffs also addressed the flaws in the
Inmate Grievance Procedure, the lack of specific staff training,
the absence of confidentiality of complaints, the inadequacy of
the investigations, and the prisons' repeated failures to take re-
medial action."4 Officers regarded inmates' complaints as a
"joke" or "gossip."2 5 One of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses tes-
tified that "in approximately 90 percent of all sexual harassment
206. See id. at 640.
207. See id.
208. See id. (including such comments as, "Well, you go ahead and do that and I'll
be in there to stick my rod up in you.'").
209. See id. at 643.
210. Id. at 643 n.8.
211. These effects include low self-esteem, self-doubt, irritability, anxiety, nervous-
ness, depression, nausea, headaches, insomnia, fatigue, and increased stress. See id.
at 642-43.
212. See id. at 645.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 640-41.
215. Id. at 641.
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cases [that] she has confronted, the Defendants often fail to
reach any conclusions in their investigations."216 One inmate
concluded that the grievance system "was like a game to every-
body there. They didn't care about anybody's feelings."217 De-
spite these allegations, the DCDC maintained that it did "every-
thing an institution can do to prevent sexual misconduct."2 8
In light of the extent of the accounts of sexual abuse and sex-
ual harassment, Judge Green could not dismiss the plaintiffs'
claims as isolated or fabricated. In her findings of fact, she not-
ed:
Within the [DCDC] there is a general acceptance of sexual
relationships between staff and inmates which creates a "sex-
ualized environment" where "boundaries and expectations of
behavior are not clear."... [One former correctional admin-
istrator has noted] "[You just get this sense that [sexual mis-
conduct] has always happened and it is always going to hap-
pen."... The most disturbing evidence of sexual harassment
involves sexual assaults on women prisoners and the inade-
quacy of the Defendants' response to these attacks.219
Unlike Judge Arcara in Fisher, Judge Green adopted the
inmate's perspective and recognized the harmful and pervasive
effects of this "sexualized environment."22 She viewed sexual
abuse of prisoners not merely as an administrative problem, but
also as a physical and mental threat to the women inmates.2
216. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
217. Brooke A. Masters, Women Tell of Sex Abuse at D.C. Jails; Trial Begins in
Suit Brought by Inmates, WASH. POST, June 14, 1994, at B1, available in 1994 WL
2292331.
218. Id. Women Prisoners was not the first time the DCDC faced a challenge to
the conditions of confinement in its prisons. Overcrowding in prisons also has been a
long-standing concern. "The District of Columbia has the highest rate of incarcera-
tion in the United States, locking up 1651 citizens per every 100,000." Katya Lezin,
Life at Lorton: An Examination of Prisonera' Rights at the District of Columbia Cor-
rectional Facilities, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 165, 170 (1996). "The vast majority of
inmates ... describe their incarceration as intolerable, and many believe that the
conditions of detainment at Lorton are particularly unpleasant." Id. at 172.
219. Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 639.
220. See id. at 665 (recognizing that "[there is a substantial risk of injury when
officers make sexual remarks in an environment where sexual assaults of women
prisoners by officers are well known and inadequately addressed").
221. See id.
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Judge Green ruled in favor of the inmate-plaintiffs because, as
a class, they were able to satisfy the subjective prong of the
Eighth Amendment claim.222 She found that the defendants
had acted with "deliberate indifference" to the women prisoners'
endurance of the condition of sexual harassment."' The evi-
dence demonstrated that the defendants both knew of and disre-
garded an excessive risk of sexual assaults and sexual harass-
ment of the women prisoners.2" Judge Green inferred the
presence of deliberate indifference from the obviousness of the
sexual harassment. "Indeed, assaults are widely known by
DCDC staff, vulgar comments are made openly and women are
fondled publicly."225 She concluded that the plaintiffs had prov-
en violations of the Eighth Amendment "by demonstrating a
level of sexual harassment that is objectively cruel and to which
the Defendants are deliberately indifferent."22
This "victory" for the plaintiffs was the result of several fac-
tors that can be attributed to the fact that the case was a class
action suit. The inmates had the ability to combine the individu-
al incidents of sexual harassment to create the "sexualized envi-
ronment" recognized by Judge Green:
In combination, vulgar sexual remarks of prison officers, the
lack of privacy within CTF [Correctional Treatment Facility]
cells and the refusal of some male guards to announce their
presence in the living areas of women prisoners constitute a
violation of the Eighth Amendment since they mutually
heighten the psychological injury of women prisoners.'
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 665-66.
225. Id. at 666.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 665 (emphasis added). Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) on April 26, 1996 as part of an effort "to address the alarming explosion
in the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by State and Federal prisoners." 141 CONG.
REC. S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995). Two sections of the PLRA adopt physical in-
jury requirements. Section 803(d) provides that: "No Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury." PLRA § 803(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997(e) (West Supp. 1997). Section
806 provides that: "No person convicted of a felony who is incarcerated . . . may
bring a civil action against the United States or an agency, officer, or employee of
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Judge Green focused on the effect of these abuses in combina-
tion, and noted that the prison setting heightens psychological
impact of abuse further because "the women are tightly con-
fined, making their escape from harassment as unlikely as es-
cape from the jail itself."228 Unlike an isolated occurrence, this
"sexualized environment" surrounds and literally consumes the
inmates. The combination of sexual abuse, harassment, and the
continual unannounced presence of male guards in the women's
cells provided a constant "reminder to women prisoners that
their exposure to abuse is almost endless."229
The publicity generated by Women Prisoners was useful in
drawing attention to the problem of sexual abuse within the
D.C. prison system, breaking the tradition of invisibility and
giving the inmates hope that they could obtain a remedy.
Brenda Smith of the National Women's Law Center told Human
Rights Watch that in working on the case since 1990, she had
received numerous reports of sexual assaults within the prisons
and assisted women on an individual basis." ° She noted, how-
ever, that the sheer magnitude and pattern of sexual abuse was
the Government for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a
prior showing of physical injury." Id. § 806, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(2) (West Supp.
1997). See generally Stacey Heather O'Bryan, Closing the Courthouse Door: The Im-
pact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury Requirement on the Con-
stitutional Rights of Prisoners, 83 VA. L. REV. 1189 (199,7) (discussing the purpose of
PLRA and its effect on the "constitutional claims by state prisoners"). On appeal, the
court considered the PLRA in the context of the Women Prisoners decision. The
appellate court did not even address the district court's reliance on the psychological
harm resulting from sexual harassment. See Women Prisoners v. District of Colum-
bia, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (neglecting to raise the issue of the psychological
harm that results from sexual harassment), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997).
228. Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 665. Judge Green distinguished the pris-
oners' environment from circumstances on the other side of the prison wall:
In free society, a woman who experiences harassment may seek the pro-
tection of police officers, friends, coworkers or relevant social service
agencies. She may also have the option of moving to locations where the
harassment would no longer occur. In sharp contrast, the safety of wom-
en prisoners is entrusted to prison officials, some of whom harass women
prisoners and many of whom tolerate the harassment.
Id.
229. Id.
230. See ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 113.
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exposed only after the class action suit was filed."' She told
Human Rights Watch that "[ilt is really like this dirty little
secret that everyone in corrections knows about and doesn't
want to talk about. It is a huge problem."232
The Washington Post coverage of the case also informed the
public of the existence of sexual abuse in prison and appealed to
the public's sentiments.233 The exposure of the problem contrib-
uted to its remedy, and responses to sexual misconduct have im-
proved since the decision in Women Prisoners. In August 1995,
for example, prison officials in the District of Columbia suspend-
ed seven corrections officers following allegations that they at-
tended a party held within the prison at which two female in-
mates were asked to perform a striptease."4
The most telling example ofthe acknowledgement of the prob-
lem of custodial sexual abuse occurred shortly after Judge Green
rendered her decision in Women Prisoners. In December 1994,
the D.C. City Council modified its rape law as it applied to indi-
viduals in police or correctional custody.235 Now, any type of
sexual intercourse or sexual contact involving an incarcerated
individual is a felony.236 Legislators, at least, are finally begin-
ning to recognize the uniquely vulnerable position of women
prisoners and the greatly magnified power disparity between
inmate and guard that increases the risk of custodial sexual
abuse in prison.
RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
As Justice Blackmun noted, concurring in Farmer v. Brennan,
"regardless of what state actor or institution caused the harm
and with what intent, the experience of the inmate is the same.
A punishment is simply no less cruel or unusual because its
harm is unintended."237 Unfortunately, since Farmer, the focus
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Masters, supra note 217, at B1.
234. See Toni Locy, 7 D.C. Jail Guards Suspended in Cellblock Striptease, WASH.
POST, Aug. 4, 1995, at C1, available in 1995 WL 9255460.
235. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4113(1), 22-4114(1) (1996).
236. See id.
237. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 855-56 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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on the intent of the guard or supervisor has become the deciding
factor, notably in cases involving claims seeking injunctive relief
for custodial sexual abuse against officers in their official capaci-
ties.US
After Farmer, plaintiffs face a dilemma in determining how to
go about establishing that the prison had knowledge of harm. In
Farmer, the Court's reference to the requirement that the in-
mate prove the prison officials' state of mind "in the usual
ways" 9 indicated that "statistics, institutional and municipal
reporting of assaults, and the existence of systemic predictive
factors, among other indicia of 'institutional knowledge' of prison
violence," are acceptable forms of "circumstantial evidence that
plaintiffs may introduce to establish knowledge of the risk of
harm."20 If the plaintiff proves that this risk is
longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted
by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest
that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to
information concerning the risk and thus 'must have known'
about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a
trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual
knowledge of the risk."'
The documentary proof required by this circumstantial evidence
standard places a great deal of confidence in the internal inves-
tigative systems of prisons, which, in cases of sexual abuse, are
frequently less effective than usual.
Victims of sexual abuse and harassment often are very cau-
tious in their reliance on any sort of internal grievance sys-
tem. 2 Inmates share this lack of faith in the formal complaint
resolution mechanisms. They feel that "the grievance procedure
238. See, e.g., supra notes 140, 151-52, and accompanying text.
239. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
240. Rifkin, supra note 64, at 301.
241. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43).
242. See, e.g., Sarah H. Perry, Comment, Enough is Enough: Per Se Constructive
Discharge for Victims of Sexually Hostile Work Environments Under Title WI, 70
WASH. L. REv. 541, 559 (1995) (noting that "m]any victims of sexual harassment
perceive that filing a formal complaint will be ineffective. Studies reveal that most
female victims of sexual harassment are unwilling to use internal grievance proce-
dures because they believe that nothing will be done").
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is 'just for show,' unanimously agreeing that only those inmates
with particularly egregious complaints can prevail in the [griev-
ance] process." 3 The Farmer Court placed special emphasis on
these prison grievances, noting that, "even when [grievance pro-
cedures] do not bring constitutionally required changes, the
inmate's task in court will obviously be much easier."' The
necessity of these prisoner grievances is problematic:
Violence in prison is often substantially underreported, as a
result either of prisoner intimidation or of staff indifference
or discouragement, and some prison records--especially those
dealing with staff use of force-have been found to be too
self-serving to meet the reliability requirements of the public
records and reports rule."
Cases of sexual abuse magnify the problem of underreporting.
In her findings of fact in Women Prisoners, Judge Green recog-
nized some of the problems of established internal grievance
procedures and investigations in addressing sexual harass-
ment. 6 Judge Green found that not only did prison officials
often fail to reach any conclusions in their investigations of
prison sexual harassment claims,24  but the prison
administration's typical response to an inmate's internal
grievance was to conclude that the allegations "could not be
validated."248 In some instances, the offending officers often
were not even reassigned after an incident was reported, 9
making the inmate hesitant to reveal incidents of abuse for fear
of retaliation. In examining prisons in the District of Columbia,
Judge Green concluded that the failures of the DCDC Internal
Grievance Policy itself constituted "deliberate indifference." She
recognized that within the D.C. prisons, "there is no clear under-
243. Lezin, supra note 218, at 204 (citing a February 1994 interview with inmates
at Lorton prison).
244. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
245. Boston et al., supra note 24, at 101 (citation omitted).
246. See Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 639-43
(D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part, modified in part, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995), re-
manded by 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997).
247. See id. at 642.
248. Id.
249. See id.
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standing of what constitutes sexual harassment and how it
should be reported.""0 In addition, the noticeable lack of confi-
dentiality caused women prisoners to suffer the trauma of hav-
ing the small prison community know the details of a personally
degrading assault."
Women prisoners also are the targets of retaliation. Prison
officials often leak confidential information, coercing women
prisoners and the staff into silence while simultaneously insulat-
ing their own actions from scrutiny.2 "The invariable result is
that cases 'cannot be resolved' and officers who commit the as-
saults are often reassigned to another facility or allowed to re-
main in the same facility." " The very procedures that the
Court in Farmer found to be virtually indispensable in bringing
a successful claim against prison officials254 were recognized by
the court in Women Prisoners as being a source of "deliberate
indifference" itselfY5
The plaintiffs in Women Prisoners took on the responsibility of
exposing to the court the inherent flaws in the process through
which inmates obtain proof of the officers' knowledge of harm.
The class action form of the suit gave the plaintiffs access to
resources and strategies that an individual plaintiff would lack:
In class action litigation, where counsel and expert witnesses
are involved on an ongoing basis, additional opportunities
exist for proving knowledge. For example, testimony or a
declaration from an expert that a risk was obvious may suf-
fice to prove that prison officials had knowledge of it. A letter
250. Id. at 666.
251. See id. This is in sharp contrast to the recommended investigation procedure
in an employment setting. "Whoever is designated as investigator [of an incident of
sexual harassment] should be able to act quickly, remain objective, conduct a thor-
ough investigation, maintain confidentiality, and be authorized to take or effectively
recommend prompt remedial measures." Alan M. Koral, Critical Decisions in the In-
vestigation of a Sex Harassment Claim - Practice Pointers and Case Law Update, in
AVOIDING AND LITIGATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 1997, at 153, 188 (PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice Series No. H-567, 1997).
252. See Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 666.
253. Id.
254. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
255. See Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 666.
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from plaintiffs' counsel apprising prison officials or their
counsel of a risk of harm should serve the same function.
Individual plaintiffs do not have these resources, and they face
intimidation from the same internal grievance procedures that
must filter requisite proof of knowledge on the part of the offi-
cials. Courts should not require plaintiffs to become a class in
order to succeed in bringing Eighth Amendment claims for cus-
todial sexual abuse.
CONCLUSION
[B]eing a woman prisoner in U.S. state prisons can be a terri-
fying experience. If you are sexually abused, you cannot es-
cape from your abuser. Grievance or investigatory proce-
dures, where they exist, are often ineffectual, and correction-
al employees continue to engage in abuse because they be-
lieve they will rarely be held accountable, administratively or
criminally. Few people outside the prison walls know what is
going on or care if they do know. Fewer still do anything to
address the problem."
The "deliberate indifference" standard outlined by the Supreme
Court in Farmer v. Brennan has left inmates who are victims of
sexual harassment with few alternatives. To succeed in a sys-
temic violations case against prison officers in their official ca-
pacities, inmates need the resources that only a class action can
afford. Proceeding on an individual basis forces a plaintiff to rely
on ineffective, intimidating, and retaliatory internal grievance
procedures to obtain proof of the prison officer's knowledge of
harm.258
256. Boston et al., supra note 24, at 102 (citation omitted).
257. ALL TOO FAMILIAR, supra note 1, at 1.
258. Similar problems have been noted with sexual harassment claims in the em-
ployment context. See, e.g., Marcy O'Brien, Comment, Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite
Co.: A Legal Standard for Class Action Sexual Harassment, 19 J. CORP. L. 417, 434
n.206 (1994) (citing several problems associated with individual claims for sexual
harassment in the workplace--"difficult to prove, not worth amount of money needed
to litigate, competent counsel is hard to attract because of less chance of settlement,
and it is doubtful that injunctive relief would cover anyone but the plaintifF).
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Experts have recommended class actions as an "appropriate
vehicle" for sexual harassment suits in the employment set-
ting, 9 and the rationale for this preference extends to women
inmates' suits for custodial sexual abuse. "Inherent disincentives
for bringing an individual... claim, such as embarrassment and
fear of retaliation, could be overcome through the use of class
actions."26 Class actions allow plaintiffs to rely on multiple in-
cidents and accounts of sexual assault in order to demonstrate
the obviousness of the abuse, allowing for an inference of "delib-
erate indifference." In light of the "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard articulated in Farmer, a class action lawsuit remains not
merely a good option for inmate-plaintiffs, but the only option.
In the future, as Justice White suggested in Wilson v. Seiter,
courts must make a distinction between cases involving an indi-
vidual claim against the offending officer and claims for systemic
violations against officers in their official capacities.2"' For the
latter category of cases, the "deliberate indifference" standard
should not apply. As the numerous unsuccessful cases brought
by female inmates have shown, if courts do not make this dis-
tinction, custodial sexual abuse will remain a "dirty little secret"
within the prisons, kept quiet by self-serving internal grievance
procedures.
Amy Laderberg
259. Id. at 421.
260. Id. at 434.
261. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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